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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RUSSELL \V·. YOUNG and 
SABA 0. YOUNG, his wife, 
.A.ppellants, 
vs. 
ELVIS HANSEN and 




Brief of Respondents 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The purported statement of facts of appellants is a 
misnomer. At most it is a purported statement of the 
pleadings and the decision-imperfectly and inadequate-
ly stated. The purported facts are strewn through the 
. argument, quoting primarily the testimony of plaintiffs 
and such portions of the evidence of defendants as they 
felt suited their particular purpose. In that manner the 
facts are thrown into the brief in such a hodgepodge man-
ner that it is almost impossible to obtain a ''concise state-
ment of the facts'' as required by Rule VIII. We shall, 
therefore, restate the case. 
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PLEADINGS 
Plaintiffs' amended complaint IS one for alleged 
breach of contract for the sale by defendants to plain-
tiffs of an undivided one-half interest in certain real 
property and some pigs, rabbits, chickens and other in-
cidental farm property. Plaintiffs alleged that the sale 
price of the half interest was to be $9000, payable on 
November 15, 1948 from the proceeds of a sale of a 
certain home belonging to plaintiffs at 3348 South State 
Street, and if the home was not sold by Nov. 15, 1948 that 
plaintiffs were to pay $50.00 per month until the home 
was sold, the $50.00 per month to apply upon the pur-
chase price; that there was a $2,000 mortgage on the 
farm, which defendants were to clear; that it was also a 
part of the agreement that plaintiffs were to move onto 
the farm with defendants, and that the parties would 
enter into a partnership agreement and operate the farm 
in the raising and sale of rabbits, chickens, pigs, etc., the 
exact terms of which partnership agreement were to be 
later determined. 
Plaintiffs further alleged that early in· July, 1948 
the agreement was modified by the parties in the follo·w-
ing particulars: That plaintiffs were to pay $4,000 on the 
pu-rchase price at that time and that upon payment of the 
$4,000 defendants were to i1nmediately and forth~vith 
give plaintiffs a warranty deed and bill of sale to a half 
interest in the real and personal property and execute a 
partnership agreement. That plaintiffs thereupon raised 
the $4,000 by mortgaging the State Street property and 
paid it to defendants and received an additional credit 
of $60 for some incidental personal property. 
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Plaintiffs further allL\ged that on or about August 1, 
1948 they moYed onto the farm and paid certain moneys 
and expended labor in looking after the pigs, chickens, 
rabbits, etc.; that defendants then promised that if 
plaintiffs ,,~ould "\Yait until NoYember 15, 1948 they would 
then execute the deed, bill of sale and partnership agree-
ment; but "\Yhen November 15, 1948 came they did not do 
so; and that. on or about February 15, 1949, after repeat-
ed delays, defendants refused to execute the deed, bill of 
sale a!J-d agreement of partnership, or either .of them, and 
refused to execute any papers to carry out the oral under-
standing, and that defendants have requested plaintiffs 
to leaYe the premises. 
Plaintiffs prayed judgment for breach of contract, 
claiming a right to repayment of $4060 plus the value of 
their labor and expenditures on the pigs, chickens, rab-
bits, etc., a. total of $5,145.93 plus interest. 
Thereafter, befole trial, the amended complaint "\vas 
amended by interlineation to include the allegation that 
plaintiffs were at all times ready and willing to perform 
their part of said agreement. 
To this amended complaint defendants, by their 
answer, admitted the agreement to sell an undivided one-
half interest in the real and personal property for $9,000 
payable on or before November 15, 1948; admitted pay-
ment of the $4000 plus an additional credit of $60 for the 
incidental personal property; admitted that a partner-
ship for operation of the property was to be formed; ad-
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mitted that plaintiffs moved onto the property and that 
the parties operated the property as a joint enterprise; 
and admitted that they refused to deed over the one-half 
interest in the property for $4,060. They denied the al-
leged modification of the agreement in July, 1948; denied 
that they had breached the agreement; and on the other 
hand alleged that plaintiffs had breached the agreement 
by failing to pay the balance of the $9,000 and by repudi-
ating the agreement and by demanding the deed and bill 
of_ sale upon the basis of the alleged modification requir-
ing the same upon payment of $4060; and by notifying 
defendants that they were not intending to go ahead with 
the original agreement as to operation of the farm, etc., 
and by demanding a return of their money plus damages. 
Upon these issues the case went to trial. There was 
a direct and irreconcilable conflict in the evidence upon 
the main issues as· follows: 
(a) Was the original contract modified 1 
(b) If not, did defendants breach the contract so 
as to entitle plan tiffs to a money judgment as prayed~ 
The trial court found that the original contract was 
substantially as pleaded and admitted by both parties ; 
that it called for payment of $9,000 by plaintiffs to de-
fendants on or before November 15, 1948, at which time 
defendants were to give the deed, bill of sale and make 
the partnership agreement; that it was agreed that until 
that time the property should be operated as a joint enter-
prise, each putting in half and taking out half in expenses 
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and net proceeds; that the parties had so operated the 
property and the net proceeds had been distributed and 
the livestock had been disposed of; that the original con-
tract had not been modified in July 1948 as alleged by 
plain tiffs ; that plaintiffs failed to pay the balance of the · 
purchase price on or after November 15, 1948 and that 
during the month of February, 1949 plaintiffs demanded 
that they be reimbursed for their expenditures; and con-
cluded therefrom that defendants had not violated the 
agreement; and that plaintiffs were not entitled to a judg-
ment against defendants for breach of agreement; and 
that a judgment in favor of defendants, ''No cause of 
action'' should be entered. 
A judgment was entered accordingly. 
ARGUMENT 
The questions on appeal, therefore, are as follows : 
(a) Was there substantial evidence to sustain the 
findings of fact~ 
(b) Did the court err 1n its conclusions of law· 
therefrom~ 
(c) Did the court err in its rulings with reference 
to admitting evidence~ 
At the outset it is well to remember that this is an 
action at law for breach of contract, for money damages 
therefor, and that as such the findings of fact of the trial 
court are to be sustained if supported by competent 
evidence. Counsel for plaintiffs seems to base his appeal 
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upon the erroneous idea that inclusion in his prayer of 
the stock phrase, ''and for such other relief as to the 
court ·may -seem proper in the premises'' has the magic 
effect of transforming it into an equity case; that on this 
appeal this court should review the evidence and decide 
that the trial court should have believed his clients; that 
the facts were as testified by his clients (in spite of the 
fact that the trial court did not believe their evidence as 
against that of defendants); that the trial court or this 
court should become attorneys for plaintiffs and tell them 
how to proceed by some action of some kind, or how to 
amend their pleadings in some hoped-for retrial of this 
case, so that they as contract violators can get some 
money damages from defendants \\Tho did not violate their 
contract. That, in substance, is the purpose and hope 
of this appeal. 
In this connection it will be observed that the defend-
ants never declared a default in the contract up to the 
time of trial. It is not a case involving an improper 
declaration of default and forfeiture. And as Judge 
VanCott stated, (R. 169), all that plaintiffs had to do, in 
order to get all that they bought, was to make a legal 
tender, as distinguished from the lip tender that they 
testified to, and which defendants denied, and then de-
mand their deed and if they didn't get it sue for specific 
performance. Instead of that they \Va.nted their money 
back plus damages for breach of contract. This the trial 
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Let us now proc.eed to consider the alleged errors. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND IN 
F .A. 'TOR OF DEFENDANTS, NO CAUSE OF ACTION. 
Appellants' first point is that the trial court erred 
in rendering a judg·ment "no cause of action" on the 
complaint for breach of contract; and that under the 
prayer for ''such other relief as to the court may seem 
proper in the premises'' the trial court should have pro-
ceeded to treat the case as a proceeding in equity for dis-
solution of a partnership, and, upon that basis, give 
plaintiffs some money judgment against defendants. 
In effect appellants are asking this court to tell the 
trial courts of this State that the pleadings mean nothing 
so long as you include in your prayer a demand for gen-
eral relief. That, of course, is not and never has been 
the la \Y. The pleadings define the issues to be tried and 
limit the power of the court. In fact, a judgment which 
has no foundation in the pleadings, or goes beyond the 
pleadings, is a nullity. 
Cooke v. Cooke, 67 Utah 371, 248 Pac. 83: 
''We, of course, must assume that the court 
made its order upon and within the issue present-
ed by the petition and that it did not go beyond it. 
It matters not what court acts. Every court must 
acquire jurisdiction from its record which every 
court must have and keep _and which binds the 
court; and there is no principle better established 
than what is not juridically presented cannot be 
juridically decided. Just as elemental is it that 
pleadings are the juridical means of investing a 
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court with jurisdiction of the subject-matter to 
adjudicate it and that a judgment or decree be-
yond or not within them is a nullity, for the court 
is bound by its record. These are immutable 
elements.'' 
Stevens & Wallis v. Golden Porphyry Mines Co., 
81 Utah 414, 18 Pac. 2d 903: 
''It is of course familiar doctrine that the 
plaintiff cannot recover upon a different cause of 
action from that which is alleged, and that he 
must recover according to the allegations of his 
complaint; that courts cannot make the complaint 
for one thing stand for a different thing. In other 
words, the recovery must be secondum allegata 
et probata, and as was stated by Mr. Justice 
Swayne in the case of Washington, A. & G. R. Co. 
v. Bradleys, 10 Wall. 299, 303, 19 L. Ed. 894, that 
'allegations and proofs must agree' and that 
'averments without proofs. and proofs without 
averments are alike unavailing,' and that the judg-
ment must conform to the scope and object of the 
pleadings. '' · 
Had the trial court, upon a complaint for money 
damages for breach of contract, entered a decree in equity 
for dissolution of a partnership which both parties al-
leged did not then exist, and upon that basis give a 
money judgment against defendants, such judgment 
would have had no foundation in the pleadings beyond 
the issues presented by the pleadings, and a nullity. 
Neither party alleged that the partnership had been 
formed and that the property belonged to the partner-
ship. Plaintiffs were not to have a half interest in the 
property until they had paid the full $9,000. Plaintiffs 
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nlleged that it 'Yas an oral contract for purchase of a half 
interest in the property and demanded damages for 
breach of the contract. They alleged that the partnership 
"ras to be formed after the purchase price was paid. De-
fendants admitted the original contract, denied that it 
had been modified, denied that defendants had breached 
the contract, and alleged that plaintiffs had themselves 
breached the contract as alleged in the ans\ver. The de-
fendants further alleged that in the meantime the parties 
had operated a joint enterprise, contributing equally to 
the expenses and sharing equally in the net proceeds, 
after payment of the expenses. This the trial court found 
to be true. Payment of the purchase price of the half 
interest was a condition precedent to the formation of the 
partnership, which was to be the relationship of the 
,parties after plaintiffs had paid for their half of the 
property. There was ample evidence to sustain the find-
ing of the trial court on this issue. 
Nor is the evidence to the contrary. Appellant refers 
to the statement of defendant Elvis Hansen (R. 148) 
wherein he said, in answer to a question of counsel for 
plaintiffs, as follows : 
"Q. l-Ie "\vas to take care of the hogs~" 
"A. It was a partnership." 
A fair reading of the entire line of questioning shows 
that counsel was asking as to whether there was a divi-
sion of responsibility in the doing of the chores and work 
about the place. The answer was merely the method used 
by the 'vitness to state that in the doing of the work there 
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was no division. Each was doing and responsible for 
helping with all of it. On the following page (R. 149) the 
witness clearly stated that the agreement was that the 
partnership agreement was to be dra,vn up after the re-
maining $5,000 was paid. 
Also it will be observed that ( R. 149) the I-Iansens 
had consulted Judge Allen of ~{urray about drawing up 
the papers to effectuate the deal; that he requested Mr. 
Young to see Judge Allen or ·have his attorney do so, 
but Mr. Young refused to do so. This "\Vas in January or 
February. Notwithstanding the fact that the November 
15, 1948 payment had not been made by plaintiffs no de-
fault had been declared by the Hansens and not\vithstancl-
ing the fact that some disagreements had arisen, the 
Hansens were willing to give the Youngs everything they 
were to get, if they would pay for it. But the Youngs did 
not want to go ahead with the deal. Instead they wanted 
their money back, plus damages for a purported breach 
of a purported modified contract; and so instead of going 
ahead and completing the deal they chose to file a suit for 
money damages. (R. 101) 
Plaintiffs' whole idea, in the allegations of their 
amended complaint, in their theory at the trial, and on 
this appeal, is that because they paid $4060 on the pur-
chase price of something that l\f r. Young didn't want in 
the first place and wanted less after they had tried it for 
a few months, that they should be entitled to their money 
back as damages. In order to do this they eonc.octed the 
idea of a modification of the agreement and then alleged 
that defenants had breached the agreement as modified. 
10 
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The alleged modification is silly in the extreme. It 
is no wonder the trial court refused to believe that by the 
modfication the Hansens agreed to convey the half in-
terest for $4,000 and then let the Youngs pay the balance 
at the rate of $50 per month, '\Then the contract called for 
them to pay the full $9,000 by November 15, 1948. The 
Youngs testified that they had the money and could have 
paid the balance. Why didn't they do it then' Because 
they didn't want to put any more money into it. They 
wanted their money out-not more money in (R.101-
Testimony of Mr. Young). 
Their amendment stating that they were willing to 
pay the balance was made at the time of trial. It was a 
last minute change of mind on the part of the Youngs-
after they had repudiated the agreement themselves 
and had brought a suit for money damages for breach of 
contract. The Hansens were perfectly within their right 
in saying that they felt the Youngs had materially breach-
ed the contract and that they, by their breach, had ab-
solved the defendants from the obligations of the 
contract. 
The Youngs are not the only ones in the world who 
have bought something which they felt that they didn't 
want after they had made a partial payment on account. 
That is a common experience "'ith most of us. Nor are 
they the first to try to get their money back after chang-
ing their minds. lVIost people who change their minds 
on those things find it difficult to get out of the o bliga-
tion to pay the balance. But if they succeed in this law-
suit they \Yill he the first litigants in history to obtain 
11 
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damages for their own breach from people who were not 
guilty of breaching the contract and who were ready and 
willing to go ahead with the contract right up to the time 
the suit was filed. 
Let us hear Mr. Young speak as to what his attitude 
was early in the year 1948 when the IIansens were trying 
to· get him to go down to see. Judge Allen : 
"Q. Now, early in 1949, you were making de-
mand upon the Hansens for your money 
back, were you not~ 
''A. Yes. 
'' Q. You demanded a note and mortgage upon 
the farm, did you not~'' 
"A. Yes." 
Counsel for appellant seems to be imbued with the 
idea that everyone who puts money into a proposition, 
regardless of the contract, is entitled to get his money 
out of it on some theory, regardless of the pleadings and 
evidence. All you have to do, according to his idea of 
law, is show that you paid in some money and then bring 
an. action, regardless of the type, and then insert in the 
prayer a demand for general relief. From there on the 
trial court or the appellate court is supposed to take over 
as attorney for the plaintiff and give you something 
back, on the basis that the code has done R\vay with the 
difference between law and equity, and something good 
should. result That, in effect, is what counsel for appel-
lant is proposing to this court. 
12 
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There 'Yere no allegations in the complaint invoking 
the equity jurisdiction of the court, nor 'vas any attempt 
made to state any cause of action in equity. It was purely 
and simply a cause of action for breach of contract. The 
necessary incidents of the agreement 'vere alleged by both 
parties, the alleged breach by defendant and the claim for 
damages, and the alleged breach by plaintiffs. Those 
were the issues framed by the pleadings. The trial court 
found that plaintiffs had not established their case and 
ordered a judgment "no cause of action". Appellants 
say the court was in error. 
In an action for breach of contract a judgment ''no 
cause of action'' simply means that the plaintiff has not 
proven his case. This court in the case of Mace v. 
Tingey, 106 Utah 420, 149 Pac. 2d 832, has directly ruled 
on this question wherein it said: 
''This brings us to the last assignment of 
error: that the verdict is contrary to, and not sup-
ported by, the evidence. Of course a verdict for 
defendant' no cause of action need not be support-
ed by any evidence at all unless the answer is a 
confession and avoidance-one which puts the full 
burden of proof on defendant. Is the verdict con-
trary to the evidence~ Generally the donee has 
the burden of proving a gift. Blackburn v. Jones, 
59 Utah 558, 205 P. 582; Ward v. Ward, 94 Or. 
405, 185 P. 906. But when an action is brought 
to recover money alleged to have been loaned by 
plaintiff to defendant under an oral contract, and 
defendant claims the money was a gift, the plain-
tiff has the burden of proving the alleged oral 
agreement to repay. Payne v. Williams, 62 Colo. 
86, 160 P. 196. Ordinarily there is no presump-
tion against a gift. Jackson v. Lamar, 67 Wash. 
13 
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385, 121 P. 857. There was here no witness who 
testified directly as to the transaction. Plaintiff 
produced witnesses, beneficiaries under the will, 
or relatives, who testified that defendant told 
them the money was a loan and that she should 
have signed a note. The so-called 'dead man stat-
ute,' Subdivision 3 of 104-49-2 U.C.A. 1943, was 
invoked by plaintiff to prevent defendant testify-
ing as to what actually occurred when the money 
changed hands. Defendant, as a witness however, 
denied making the statements attributed to her 
by plaintiff's witnesses. She offered a witness 
who corroborated her denial that she had 
stated the money was a loan; another witness 
testified that deceased had t~ld him she had given 
defendant the money. Evidence, some phases of 
which we have discussed in connection with other 
questions, was offered by both sides relative to 
the relationship between deceased and the bene-
ficiaries under the will; also between deceased 
and the defendant. There was a direct conflict in 
the evidence as to whether the tra.nsaction 1vas a 
loam or a gift. The question was properly sub-
m.itted to the fury. If found for defendant, no 
caruse of action. The verdict is not contrary to the 
evidence.'' 
Of course the case at bar does not rest on failure of proof 
on the part of defendants. There is competent, affirmative 
evidence to support the findings and judgment. 
The trial court disposed of all of the issues raised in 
the case and presented by the pleadings. Now defeated 
on the action, pleadings and the case presented, and all of 
which was chosen by them, appellants seek by this 
appeal to present another matter (whatever it is) with-
out issues or evidence. Miller v. Johnson (on Rehearing), 
14 
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. 43 Utah 468, 134 P. 1017 .... ~\ppellants further set up cer-
tain facts ns the gospel truth but it is evident from the 
judgment that the trial court failed to entertain that 
Yie''?· 1\s claimed by appellants, respondents did come to 
issue \Yith them upon the \'"arious items, not of account 
ns no\v they are designated but of damages, and appel-
lants failed in their action. 
The relief in any action must be consistent with the 
issues presented and the case made and even under the 
libera.lit3~ of the Code a plaintiff may not plead his action, 
frame his issues at his O\vn election, and then upon fail-
ure, ".,.ithout amendment, abandon the case made and 
framed by him and recover in a different form of action 
than the one he selected. This has been consistently true 
since the time of the adoption of the Code. Davis v. Utah 
. Southern R. Co., 3 Utah 218, 2 Pac. 521. 
IS THE CO~{CLUSION THAT THE DEFENDANTS 
DID XOT VIOLATE THE TERMS OF THE 
AGREEMENT ERROR~ 
The trial coul~t concluded as a matter of law that 
Llcfendants had not violated the contract. 
This conclusion of law \Vas based upon Findings of 
Fact III, IV, V, VI, VII and 'TIII, \vherein the court 
found that the contract had not been modified as alleged 
and claimed by plaintiffs, and wherein the court found the 
facts showing full anl substantial performance by de-
fendants of all that they had agreed to do, and wherein 
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Defendants were to do nothing further with refer-
ence to conveying the title until plaintiffs paid the 
balance. 
What are the breaches of contract alleged 1n the 
amended complaint~ 
(a) Refusal to make the deed, bill of sale and 
partnership agreement in July, 1948, upon payment of 
the $4,000.00. 
(b) Refusal to make the deed, bill of sale and 
partnership agreement in November. 
(c) Refusal to make the same in February and re-
pudiation of the agreement by demanding that plaintiffs 
move. 
All of these allegations of breach were predicated 
upon the theory that defendants breached the alleged 
modification. In other words, they claimed that defend-
ants refused to make the deed upon payment of $4060.00 
and permit plaintiffs to pay the balance at $50.00 per 
month. 
When the trial court found that no such contract 
existed as claimed by plaintiffs, it follows as a matter 
of course that defendants could not and did not violate 
a provision which did not exist. 
It certainly cannot be contended that there is no evi-
dence to sustain the finding that the original contract 
was not modified. 
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Defendants testified that in January and February, 
in fact before that, they hired Judge Allen of Murray 
to prepare all of the papers upon the assumption that 
plaintiffs intended to pay the balance, but plaintiffs re-
fused to go see Judge Allen or have their attorney see 
him. They "\Yonld have none of it. They had in mind 
getting their money back. 
Defendants denied that plaintiffs had ever made any 
tenders of money to them. 
Defendants not only "\Yere willing to go ahead with 
the deal up to the time of filing the action, had never 
declared any default, but had engaged a reputable lawyer 
to prepare the papers. That is the very essence of good 
faith. They were more than indulgent of the failure of 
plaintiffs to pay. 
But "\Yhen someone in default in payments brings a 
suit against you for return of his money, plus damages, 
repudiates the contract and claims that you made a con-
tract that you did not make, all for the purpose of getting· 
out of a deal and getting his money back, that is a dif-
ferent matter. Defendants' testimony that he was not 
willing to go ahead was his evidence as to his attitude 
at that time-not his attitude before the suit. Under the 
law he was justified in regarding the suit for breach 
of contract, coupled with the failure of plaintiffs to pay 
or tender payment as a material breach of the contract, 
w·hich it was. 
Whether plaintiffs have any other, different, or fur-
ther remedies in the 1ight of the present situation is not 
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before this court for decision. The sole question is: did 
defendants violate the contract as proven so as to make 
them liable in damages~ The evidence supports the judg-
ment and decision of the trial court that they did not. 
THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW A.RE PROPERLY 
SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS OF FACT. 
It is fundamental that the support of a Conclusion 
of Law rests within the Findings of Fact. It is submitted, 
and it is apparently conceded, that the Findings herein 
support the Conclusions of La\\T. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT ON QUESTIONS 
OF FACT WILL NOT BE DISTURBED UNLESS 
lVIANIFESTLY ERRONEOUS. 
Appellants' points 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of their argument 
are all directed at certain Findings of Fact as made by 
the trial court. It has been firmly and definitely settled 
over a long period of time by this court that the trial 
court may determine the facts and judge the credibility 
of witnesses, and, if supported by any substantial evi-
dence, the finding of fact will not be disturbed on appeal. 
DeCorso v. Booth, 97 Utah 145, 91 Pae. 2d 449; Farrel Y. 
Cameron, 98 Utah 68, 94 Pac. 2d 1068; Romney v. Covey 
Garage, 100 Utah 167, 111 Pac. 2nd 545; Yowell v. Occi-
dental Life Ins., 100 Utah 120, 110 Pac. 2d 566. As a 
matter of fact in DeCorso v. Booth, supra, this court 
stated that this rule is so well settled ''that citation of 
authorities should not be necessary." 
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As point 4 of appellants' argument it is contended 
that there is no evidence supporting that of Finding III 
that ''"~hen plaintiffs paid the defendants the sum of 
$9000.00 * * * that the parties 'vould then enter into a 
partnership agreement' ' and that there is no evidence 
' __ 'That the said $9000.00 should be paid to defendants 
on or before X ovember 13, 1948. '' As to substantial evi-
dence supporting these findings the court's attention 
is invited to the following: 
"Q. I'll ask you to state, ~fr. Hansen, whether or 
not you ever had an arrangement with the 
Youngs for the payment of fifty dollars a 
month commencing on November 15, 1948 ~ 
'' .\. N . 
_'":\._ ..L o, sir. 
'' Q. ..Lc\_nd did you ever have an agreement for the 
payment of that sum subsequent to that 
time? 
" .... ~. No, sir." (R. 135) 
'' Q. All right, after this agreement when were 
you to give him the title~ 
''A. When the nine thousand dollars was fully 
paid-on November 15th or right after. 
'' Q. Didn't he offer to pay you the the balance 
of the nine thousand dollars right after 
November 15th if you would have the 
papers made out~ 
"A. No, sir." (R. 146) 
* * * * * 
"Q. And in what way~ (Was he getting jittery) 
"A. Because at the end of November 15th when 
the deal was to be closed, it hadn't been 
closed." (R. 147) 
* * * * * 
19 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"Q. Now do you recall, Mrs. Hansen, what the 
agreement was as to how that nine thousand 
dollars was to be paid~ 
"A. The way I understood it, it was supposed to 
be paid on or shortly after the 15th of No-
vember.'' (R. 154-155) 
* * * * * 
'' Q. Now in this original agreement, suppose 
their house wasn't sold by November 15th, 
what was the arrangement~ 
"A. The understanding that I had was that Mr. 
Young would get it through other sources.'' 
(R. 158) 
Appellants fail to argue Assignments of Error 5 and 
6 and no reply is necessary by respondents. 
In Assignment of Error No. 7 it is claimed that 
there is no evidence to support Finding VII that the net 
proceeds of the joint operation and the expenses were 
divided equally between the parties. As to substantial 
evidence supporting this finding the court's attention 
is invited to the following: 
"Q. And what happened to that livestock~ 
''A. It was sold, except the rabbits, and equally 
divided. 
'' Q. And did Mr. Hansen receive half of the 
money that you received for that livestock~ 
''A. Mr. Hansen or Mr. Young~ 
"Q. I mean the plaintiff. 
"A. Mr. Young received half. 
'' Q. In every case~ 
''A. In every case except one. 
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"Q. ....\.nd ""hat one '"'as that '1 
"A. That '"'as the last amount of pigs that I sold 
'"'hen he accused me of selling them and 
uever giving him the money. It was sold 
on his own request. 
"Q. What happened to the money~ 
'' .... \.. I kept it for the expense of the truck that 
accumulated in the year's time or in the 
time. 
'' Q. Was it your truck that was being used all 
of this time '? 
'• A. Y es,sir. In fact two of them. 
'' Q. Two of your trucks~ 
'' .. A._. Two trucks.'' ( R. 138) 
.._\s point 8 of appellants' argument it is contended 
that there is no evidence to support making a part of Find-
ing No. VIII, that on or after November 15, 1948 plain-
tiffs failed, neglected, and refused to pay the balance of 
said purchase price. As to substantial evidence to sup-
port this finding the court's attention is invited to the 
follo,Ying: 
'' Q. Was the balance of five thousand dollars 
ever paid~ 
"A. No. 
"Q. Was it ever offered to you prior to the com-
mencement of this action~ 
"A. N . o, sir. 
'' Q. And never during the times mentioned here 
today has that been offered to you, is that 
correct~ 
''A. No, sir.'' (R. 135) 
* * * * • 
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'' Q. In regard to the fifty dollar matter, was 
there any payments of fifty dollars ever of-
fered to you~ 
"A. No, sir." (R. 136) 
* * * * * 
'' Q. All right, after this agreement when were 
·you to give him the title~ 
''A. When the nine thousand dollars was fully 
paid on November 15th or right after. 
'' Q. Didn't he offer to pay you the balance of 
the nine thousand dollars right after No-
vember 15th if you would have the papers 
made out~ 
"A. No, sir." (R. 146) 
* * * * * . 
'' Q. Do you know if the balance of five thousand 
dollars was ever paid~ 
"A. No, sir. 
"Q. Do you know if it was ever offered to your 
husband~ 
"A. No, sir. 
'' Q. Was there any of it after the 15th of No-
vember ever offered or paid to you~ 
"A. No, sir. 
'' Q. Was there any ever tendered~ 
"A. No, sir. 
The Court : I think you asked here if any of 
it was ever paid and she said, 'No, sir.' 
"A. It has never been paid or been paid up to 
this date. 
"Q. And I think I asked you has it ever been 
tendered~ 
"A. No." (R. 155-156) 
Appellants here have done exactly what this court 
detected in the De Corso case, supra. Appellants com-
plain and assail the findings of the trial court. because 
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it adopted the defendants' evidence with respect thereto 
rather than that adduced by plaintiffs upon the subject. 
It is submitted that ail of the findings of fact attacked 
by appellants are "'"ell supported by substantial evidence 
to maintain them and this court, in a.la\Y action, is bound 
by these findings and it is not a basis of reversal, even, 
in the words of the Yowell case, supra, "If we are inclin-
ed to arrive at a different conclusion than the trial judge. 
Fee Y. X ationa.l Bank, 37 Utah 28, 106 Pac. 517." 
RECEPTION OF EXHIBIT I WAS PROPER 
Counsel for appellants reads a great deal of his 
own \Yishful thinking into the evidence and it is his o~.­
conclusion and that of no one else that Exhibit I was ali 
attempt for a compromise settlement. Nowhere in· the -
eYidence does it appear that these parties were engaged 
in or negotiating for any kind of a settlement and no 
spirit of compromise and settlement pervaded the occa--
sion. It "~as no offer but the presentment of a claim and 
demand. -'-L\_ppellants voluntarily presented to the Han~ 
sens a statement concerning their alleged claims. As· a 
matter of fact the Exhibit was introduced only to show 
the great difference between the demands of their action, 
the demands as shown by their evidence and their pre-
vious demands. It simply discredited appellants as to 
the knowledge of truth of their testimony and sworn com-
plaint. It was evidence of an independent fact which is 
certinly and properly admissable. 
The foundation for reception of Exhibit I was 
properly laid by sho,ving that it was presented as a 
computation and demand. (R. 102-104) 
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CONCLUSION 
This appeal has two purposes: (a) to have this court 
reverse the trial court on its findings that the contract 
was never modified as alleged by the plaintiffs and 
denied by the defendants; or to reverse the finding that 
the defendants did not breach the contract; or (b) to send 
the case back on some theory, regardless of what it may 
be, so that it can be retried on some theory other than 
breach of contract, the theory upon which it was filed 
and tried. We respectfully submit that in a law case 
involving breach of contract the only question before 
this court on the two main questions is as to whether 
there was substantial competent evidence to support 
the judgment. The two principal issues were: What 
"\\7as the contract, and did the defendants breach it so 
as to make them liable in damages~ Upon those issues 
the evidence was in conflict and the trial court found 
that plaintiffs had not sustained the burden of proof. 
So far as this case is concerned that is where it should 
begin and end. 
This is not so much an appeal by appellants upon the 
real merits of the case as framed by _the pleadings and 
tried by the court, but an attempt on the part of appel-
lants to impress this court with the fact that somehow in 
some action not before the court they should get their 
money back, plus damages, and they wander in the wild-
erness, quoting at random from bits of evidence, mostly 
their own, seeking a guiding hand and advice from this 
court as to how they shall proceed to accomplish their 
purpose which has been, ever s1nce they could not se1l 
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their State Street home for $16,000.00, how to get their 
money back rather than to fulfil their contract. 
\"\Thy vras this la,Ysnit started '1 The Hansens never 
declared a default not,Yithstanding the failure to pay on 
X ovember 15, 1948. They had placed the matter with 
Judge Allen of l\lurray to prepare the papers, notwith-
standing some minor differences had arisen. One. of the 
papers to be dra,vn was the partnership agreement, 
which obviously took a consultation with both parties. 
The Youngs were notified of this. Mrs. Young so testi~ 
fied (R. 122). They never 'vent near Judge Allen. It 
seems strange that the attorney for plaintiffs never con-
taeted him before bringing a lawsuit, if they wanted to go 
ahead with the contract. That was not what they wanted. 
The record is replete with evid,ence of both parties that 
from November 15, 1948 on the only interest of the 
y oungs was in getting their money back plus an ac-
counting for the joint venture.. They demanded it time 
and time again, according to the evidence of both parties-. 
We have no doubt, if the Youngs sincerely wanted to per-
form their contract and complete the purchase of their 
half interest, that a simple effort in that regard with 
Judge Allen would have produced the deed and an agree-
ment for further operations if it was still desired. But 
that was not what the plaintiffs wanted. They wanted 
their money out-not more money in. That is why they 
brought an action for breach of contract instead of 
specific performance with a tender of the balance due. 
According to the testimony of Mr. Young {R. 76),, Mr. 
IIansen even offered to stand half of any loss in dis-
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counting the contracts which Mr. Young had with Dr. 
Marlin if the Youngs would go ahead, but the Youngs 
didn't want to go ahead-they wanted to call it off and 
get a note and mortgage from the Hansens. That is why 
the lawsuit for money damages for purported breach of 
contract was filed instead of making an effort with Judge 
Allen to get the papers completed. When they breached 
and repudiated the contract themselves, not only by fail-
ing to pay but by demanding that defendants repay them 
their money and respond in damages, and then started a 
lawsuit upon the basis of a contract that never existed 
and alleged breach of contract that never existed, they 
placed themselves in a position where, so far is this case 
is concerned, they must stand or fall on the law case for 
breach of contract. Whether they do or do not have some 
other or different remedy in the light of their conduct is 
not before this court on this appeal. The only question 
before this court is : Are they entitled to recover for 
breach of contract as alleged~ We respectfully submit 
that there was ample evidence to support the findings 
t 
and decision of the trial court that they are not. 
Throughout his brief, appellants' counsel has re-
lated evidence favorable to his clients, primarily from 
his own clients. In each an¢1. every material fact related 
by him such evidence stands in the record postively and 
categorically denied by evidenc.e of the Hansens. Of 
course, the ultimate purpose of counsel is to impress this 
court of claimed equities in favor of his clients. These 
respondents submitted to the issues presented. Had the 
action been of some other nature, it is not only conceiY-
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able but eYident that equities in respondents' favor would 
also haYe appearPd. _An illustration of one of these facts 
is the statement that appellants '"'ere willing to perform. 
The Hansens denied this statement. It appears that Mr. 
Young \vas forced into unhappy and undesirable arrange-
ment by his 'vife (R. 165, 9~) and after a short experience 
tried to get out of it, eYen to the point of commencing 
litigation against his friends. 
Respondent cannot urge too strongly that appellants 
failed in one thing, and that was to sustain their own 
action that respondents had breached their agreement. 
The issue \vas that simple. 
The Hansens never suggested nor commenced liti-
gation over this problem, but this costly action wrong-
fully initiated by the Youngs has been cast upon them. 
It is surely no valid complaint that the one sitting in 
judgment failed to be impressed by the story of plaintiffs. 
It is submitted that there was no error and that the 
trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICH AND ELTON, 
Attorneys for Respondents. 
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